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COSMOPOLITANISM INSIDE OUT:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND THE




INTRODUCTION: THE HOPE, THE MOVE
On a number of fronts, progressive people working on behalf of
historically disenfranchised groups have been turning, ever hopeful, to
international human rights law as a source of aid. Civil rights organiza-
tions invoke the Genocide Convention to oppose forced sterilization of
women of color and high rates of capital punishment for men. Ameri-
can Indian lawyers and scholars have been turning to United Nations
commissions and working groups in hopes of righting historic wrongs
not easily redressed locally.2 Activists opposing pornography, hate
* Charles Inglis Thompson Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
** Research Associate in Law, University of Colorado.
The following essay is an expanded version of the 1994 Day, Bery and How-ard address
at the University of Connecticut School of Law, October 31, 1994. We gratefully acknowledge
the research assistance of Bonnie Kae Grover, and the hospitality of the Connecticut Law Re-
view, particularly Donna Ryan, Research and Symposium Editor.
1. See Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ. 2347. 2360 (1991);
see also LAWRENCE J. LEBL.ANC, TiE UNTED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CO.WL=N0. (1991);
Symposium, The Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1195 (1991).
2. Robert A. Wiliams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Surv'ival in the World, 1990 DUKE U. 660, 665.
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speech, and prostitution similarly have tried to link their campaigns to
various principles of international human rights law.3This international turn is attractive on a number of levels. First, it
is idealistic and aspirational. By invoking norms ratified by the interna-
tional human community, we transcend parochialism and self-interest.
4
By focusing on laws and standards laid down by all for the governance
of all, we reinforce the bonds that unite people everywhere. On a more
pragmatic level, the move may serve to shame local authorities into
acting in situations where a minority group, struggling alone, lacks the
authority or influence to accomplish its ends.5 Thus, when a leading
writer and activist against hate speech and pornography points out that
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination outlaws hate propaganda; that states which have signed
and ratified this convention are obligated to adopt laws that prohibit
racist speech; that over two dozen countries, including many in western
Europe have done so; that Article 20 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights obliges states to enact legislation prohibiting
"advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incite-
ment to discrimination, hostility, or violence";6 that Article 13 of the
American Convention on Human Rights holds that any hate propaganda
that constitutes an incitement to lawless violence against a person or
group on account of race, color, religion, language or national origin
shall be punishable by law; and that a new Convention on Elimination
of Sexual Exploitation is now being considered by the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations,7 it behooves us to take note.
Will the international move (by which we mean the turn to broader
bodies of law and policy than merely United States norms like the
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment) prove successful?
Although we applaud the effort, we have our doubts. As frequently
happens in United States civil rights law, countervailing norms are
quickly found to curtail the claim to relief.8 Minority groups who band
3. THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura
Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., forthcoming 1995).
4. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
489-99 (1992).
5. Williams, supra note 2, at 665, 667, 699-704.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16,
1966, art. 20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
7. Letter from Laura Lederer to Spencer Carr (Oct. 1994) (on file with the authors).
8. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1988) (detailing twists and turns in
search for racial justice in U.S.).
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together to seek protection are charged with engaging in identity poli-
tics and seeking group rights.9 Recognizing claims to cultural
uniqueness is said to operate in derogation of the ideal of the cosmo-
politan person, the citizen of the world who is not bound by ties of
narrow nationalism but who draws from and identifies with the tradi-
tion, the art, the culture of many nations at once.' In this Essay, we
sketch, in Part I, one guise in which the counterattack against group
rights proceeds, namely "cosmopolitanism." We then identify, in Part II,
the virtues and defects of the cosmopolitan ideal as a standard for na-
tional and international behavior. In Part I, we draw some lessons for
reformers who may be tempted to place unwarranted faith in interna-
tional human rights law as a source of progressive arguments and
change.
I. THE COUNTER-MOVE: WALDRON, RUSHDIE AND THE COSMO BoYs
In a recent article," Jeremy Waldron, an English-trained lawyer
and philosopher teaching at the University of California-Berkeley
School of Law, makes a determined statement in favor of the cosmo-
politan ideal and against identity politics. A cosmopolitan person, he
writes, may live all his or her life in one city and maintain the same
citizenship throughout.' He or she is not necessarily an exile (like his
hero Salman Rushdie), nor a perpetual refugee or traveler. 3 But "he
refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or
his citizenship or his language."' 4 Such a person is eclectic: "[Hi]e
does not take his identity to be compromised when he learns Spanish,
eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi
sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, follows Ukrainian
9. See Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 751 (1992). For other (less accusatory) writings on cosmopolitanism in international or
domestic affairs, see CHRs BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: NEW NORMATvE
APPROACHES (1992); UNtVERsALsM VERSUs COMiuNrTARIAN'IsM (David M. Rasmussen ed.,
1990); David Hollinger, Postethnic America, 2 CONTImOx 79 (1992); see also ALASDAIR
MACINTYRF, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONAUrrY. 388 (1988); Charles Taylor, Cross-
Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERAuSM AND THE MORAL LIFE 159 (Nancy
L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
10. Waldron, supra note 9, at 752-66.
11. Waldron, supra note 9. For a recent diatribe against the domestic version of Valdron's
target, see Richard Epstein, Legal Education and the Politics of Exclusion, 45 Sr1N. L REV.
1607 (1993).





politics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques."' 5 Such a per-
son "is a creature of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up
world and having a mixed-up self.'
' 6
Living such a life commends itself, according to Waldron, first,
because it is practically unavoidable today, 7 and, second, because cos-
mopolitanism can guard against the excesses of narrow nationalism, of
which Salman Rushdie's death threat and resulting perpetual refugee
status is a prime example.' Finally, communitarian excess
(cosmopolitanism's opposite) is costly. It entails the propping up of
dying cultures by the modem, thriving ones that surround them. 9 The
former want to have things both ways-they want to be allowed to
survive, but their survival needs financing by more successful cultures
that have modernized and joined the marketplace of commerce and
ideas.2" The desire of an indigenous person to enjoy immersion in his
culture "may be something that particular people like and enjoy. But
they no longer can claim that it is something that they need."'"
The modem world is becoming thoroughly international. The citizen
of today watches the same news watched by a citizen of a city thou-
sands of miles away, eats international cuisine, and wears clothes de-
signed in Paris and Milan and produced in Hong Kong or Korea.22
From the viewpoint of such a cosmopolite, "immersion in the traditions
of a particular community in the modem world is like living in Disney-
land . .,,23 And the agitation we see today "is like demanding the
funds to live in Disneyland and the protection of modem society for
the boundaries of Disneyland, while still managing to convince oneself
that what happens inside Disneyland is all there is to an adequate and
fulfilling life."24 For Waldron, the demise of such a racial identity or
cultural minority group is no great loss. "It is like the death of a
fashion or a hobby, not the demise of anything that people really
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 763.
18. See id. at 765.
19. Id. at 763.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 762.
22. Id. at 754, 756; see also id. at 769-74 (cosmopolitanism of taste, reading, other
influences).





Citing Salman Rushdie's famous "I am a mongrel" passages,26
Waldron equates preserving minority cultures with "a fascinating anthro-
pological experiment, '  one that "involves an artificial dislocation
from what actually is going on in the world. That it is an artifice is
evidenced by [the way in which] immersion often requires special sub-
sidization and extraordinary provision by those who live in the real
world .... The charge, in other words, is one of inauthenticity."' s
Old national industries have been destroyed, he goes on to point
out.29 Modem persons "have intercourse in every direction." ° Our
interdependence is global, not national, "and certainly not civic or paro-
chial."' Citing F. A. Hayek, Adam Smith, Rawls, and Walzer, Wal-
dron urges that our interdependence is also moral and intellectual; we
read and are shaped by the same influences." We also face the same
problems: pollution crosses boundaries 3 Depletion of resources in one
part of the world affects all." Only broad, worldly perspectives will
enable us to come to grips with these problems-not the narrow ones
of a Zulu villager, a feminist in Minneapolis, or a race reformer in
Hartford. The forces that shape us today are our language, our litera-
ture, our science, our civilization, and less and less the peculiar rituals,
historical animosities, and self-centered passions of small villages or
ethnic groups s Liberals should recognize these things and waste less
time in agitating for the narrow agendas of small groups that are bound
for oblivion3 6 We all need culture, but that is no reason to deify and
make special efforts to preserve small ones3 7 Cultures live, grow,
change, amalgamate with other cultures, and adapt themselves to chang-
25. Id. at 762.
26. Id. at 751-52 (quoting Salman Rushdie: "a love song to our mongrel selves ... . I was
already a mongrel self").
27. Id. at 763.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 770.
30. Id. at 771 (quoting Karl Marx).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 775.
33. Id. at 776 (and thus "localism . . . would be catastrophic").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 776; see also id. at 761-63.
36. See id. at 761-63, 793.
37. See id. at 761-63.
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ing circumstances. 38 "[T]he hybrid lifestyle of the true cosmopolitan is
in fact the only appropriate response to the modem world in which we
live."39
Indians demanding protection of their lands and culture, women and
minorities demanding respectful treatment, and cultures demanding pro-
tection of rituals and practices, then, should be evaluated straightfor-
wardly according to how these demands would be seen by a cosmo-
politan member of the larger culture.' If to such a person, these de-
mands appear petty, expensive, frivolous, troublesome, or
inauthentic-calculated only to prop up a tottering regime or ego-then
the majority group has no obligation to satisfy them (except, perhaps,
as anthropological curiosities).4' Indeed, in the final pages of his arti-
cle, Waldron urges that it may, indeed, be immoral for the major pow-
ers to do so. Far from being "cozy and attractive," group allegiances
today are as apt to build on "ancient hatreds of one's neighbors as
immemorial traditions of culture."42
II. COSMOPOLITANISM INSIDE OUT: THE GOOD AND THE BAD
Can anything positive be said about cosmopolitanism, as it is de-
ployed in the international arena by authors like the ones mentioned?
Of course. Cosmopolitanism can operate as a brake against narrow
nationalism, focusing attention on our common humanity.43 Yet, like
other neutral principles," cosmopolitanism has its downside. It urges
us to disregard features of social life that otherwise would call for
action.' Readers of postmodem literature will recognize the
deconstructionist move. 6 A minority group comes forward and asks
for protection or preservation. It says, "I hurt," or, "I am in danger,
please help." The cosmopolitan's response is, "Who are you? I don't
recognize selves, particularly of your sort. And your harms, insofar as
38. Id. at 787-88; see also id. at 775, 785.
39. Id. at 763.
40. Id. at 761-66, 793.
41. Id. at 763, 764.
42. Id. at 793.
43. See supra notes 4-7, 17-18 and accompanying text.
44. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
45. An example is substantive injustices. See supra notes 1-10; see also infra notes 70-79.
46. See Richard Delgado, Moves, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Stances,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (1991).
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they are related to preserving what you call your ancient identity, I am
not bound to recognize. Modernize-get with the program.'" 7
Cosmopolitanism can thus impair the task of remedying ancient and
not so ancient wrongs. Remedies will seem like tribalism; like catering
to the unique sensitivity of a small group.4 "You hurt me" is met by
the rebuff: "Don't be so parochial. Think about something else." Harms
to groups become practically incoherent, an insistence on a sentimental,
preservationist program.4 9 Yet, in a hundred ways, our laws and pat-
terns of thinking do recognize harms to groups. We provide recompense
for harm to a corporation, a baseball team, a husband and wife for loss
of the other's consortium. ° Ordinary intuitions reveal that we rely on
others, present and past, to sustain us and our sense of selves.5
But the cosmopolitan move makes it difficult to see this. Like
Wechsler's neutral principles,52 cosmopolitanism points us only to a
particular range of considerations; that is, what is happening at this
moment in time, across cultures. The uniqueness of the clamoring group
and its history are lost. We are given only a snapshot, a horizontal slice
of their situation, and we are told to ascertain what, if anything, they
are due in light of what this shows5 3 Debts, obligations, the need for
reparations-all of these are not easily captured by the cosmopolitan
calculus, which merely asks: what would a citizen of the
world-urbane, educated, broadly traveled-want? Neutral principles
cannot easily capture non-symmetric events, such as A harmed B.
Return for a moment to the hate-speech illustration mentioned in
the introduction to this Essay. 4 It is instructive on two levels. First,
47. Carol Weisbrod, Minorities and Diversities: The "Remarkable Experiment" of the League
of Nations, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359 (1993).
48. Waldron, supra note 9, at 757, 761-64, 776. 793.
49. Id. at 761, 763, 793.
50. ROBERT W. HAMILTON. THE LAW OF CORORRATIONS 1 (1991).
51. Frank Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L REV. 4 (1986).
52. Wechsler, supra note 44.
53. Waldron, supra note 9, at 757-58. 761-65, 792-93.
54. On the hate speech controversy in general see Robin Barnes. Standing Guard for the
P.C. Militia, or, Fighting Indifference: Some Thoughts on Expressive Hate-Conduct and Political
Correctness, 1992 U. ILL L. REv. 979; Richard Delgado, Words Thai Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling. 17 HARV. C.R. C.L L REV. 133 (1932);
Charles R. Lawrence I1, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Hate Speech on Campus. 1990
DuKE LJ. 431; Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); ACLU Policy Statement Free Speech and Bias on Col-
lege Campuses (Oct. 13, 1990), reprinted in Nadine Strossen. Regulating Free Speech on Cam-
pus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE LJ. 484, 571.
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consider how the controversy has played itself out in the United States,
particularly with respect to the part played by the main neutral principle
at stake, namely the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.s5 Be-
ginning about ten years ago, a number of U.S. schools and universities
began experiencing an upsurge in the number of racist incidents and
name-calling taking place on their campuses.56 These incidents includ-
ed out-and-out hate crimes, such as physical attacks on blacks and
arson against buildings housing black departments or living groups. 7
Others took the form of racist expression, such as taunts, epithets,
anonymous leaflets, the defacing of posters, and hate-filled graffiti writ-
ten on campus walls or structures.58 On several campuses, the number
of minority group students dropped, as students transferred and parents
of color opted to send their sons and daughters elsewhere. 9 Empirical
studies conducted by the National Institute Against Prejudice and Vio-
lence indicate that about 80 percent of minority-group students are the
victims of hate speech at least once during their college years.60
Many institutions responded by issuing official statements con-
demning campus racism, and by offering special classes and counsel-
ing.6' Others-as many as 200-responded by enacting student con-
duct codes that penalize various types of hate speech, generally in face-
to-face, one-on-one situations.62 These codes were immediately chal-
lenged in court.63  The national American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) has declared its intention to challenge each and every one as a
55. U. S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . ").
56. Richard Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules].
57. Id. at 348-54; see also Matsuda, supra note 54, at 2326-31.
58. Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 56, at 348-58; see also Matsuda, supra
note 54, at 2332-33.
59. Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 56, at 387 n.359.
60. Howard C. Ehrlich et al., The Traumatic Effect of Ethnoviolence, in THE PRICE WE PAY,
supra note 3.
61. Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech Regu-
lation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1807
(1994).
62. Id.
63. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding
that a university rule prohibiting students from directing discriminatory epithets at particular indi-
viduals was overly broad and unduly vague); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (recognizing the standing to challenge the constitutionality of a university




violation of the First Amendment." That amendment prohibits the
regulation of speech, at least in the absence of a very good reason. In
most cases, the ACLU has found no such good reason. Speech codes
regulate expression based on its content and, hence, are non-neutral."
A better approach to the problem of hate speech, according to many
free-speech purists and defenders, is more speech in which the victim
speaks back to the hurler of the offending language." Message A can-
cels out the harm of message B, exactly as the marketplace of ideas is
supposed to operate. Indeed, if the minorities have the better argument,
they ought to prevail and argue down the ignorant or bigoted hate
speaker. Not only is this a preferred way to resolve controversies in a
political system like ours which is committed to dialog and change, it
is especially appropriate on a college campus, which ought to be a
bastion of free speech and inquiry.67
We call this argument neutralist because it is indifferent to the
content of the two messages. The business of courts and universities is
to monitor and assure a free exchange of ideas, not that one or the
other wins out. What does this argument ignore? At least two things.
First, it overlooks that First Amendment jurisprudence is anything but
neutral. Over the years, courts have tolerated or carved out dozens of
"exceptions" and special doctrines aimed at protecting the interest of
some strong party or the state.' These include libel and defama-
tion-which protect the interest of wealthy individuals in not having the
property interest in their reputations damaged;69 copyright-which pro-
tects the interest of established writers in not having their works imitat-
ed;70  words of monopoly; 7' words of threat;' perjury;' false
64. Strossen, supra note 54.
65. Id. at 504.
66. The most noted proponent of this position is Nat Hentoff. See, e.g., NAT HETOFF. FREE
SPEECH FOR ME, BUT NoT FOR THEE?. (1992).
67. Id.
68. Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 56, at 377-78.
69. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (holding that libelous utterances are not
within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech); see also Hutchinson v. Promire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979) (holding that a member of Congress is not protected by the First Amendment
for allegedly defamatory statements made in press releases and news releases); Getz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (holding that the ability of the media to avoid liability
only by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate protection to First
Amendment liberties).
70. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (195); Zachini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
71. On punishment of price-fixing. see L SULUVAN, ANTITRUST 29-30. 132-34 (1977).
72. On the various crime-% or threat. see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMiNAL LAW 177-82,
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advertising; 74 and dozens of other forms of speech that have been
deemed unprotected because they threaten either the state, consumers as
a group, or other interest groups with the power to insist on such an
"exception." Free speech turns out not to be neutral when the interests
of a powerful group are at stake.
Second, it overlooks that hate speech of the sort we are discussing
has no ready, free market remedy. Talking back is often impossible.
Hate speech is a performative, less an invitation to a discussion than a
slap in the face.7" "Nigger, go back to Africa" is hardly rebutted by
"Sir, I may indeed be an African American, but prevailing notions of
morality and the political theory of equality of all persons provide that
I am nevertheless just as entitled as you are to attend school here.
Indeed, let me cite you to a number of Supreme Court cases that so
hold." This response is absurd on its face, and often foolhardy-an
invitation to serious violence. Hate speech is part of a system of
slights, microaggressions, and put downs that render persons of color
"one-down" in many transactions that clearly matter.76 It is not an in-
vitation to a discussion, but rather the opposite-a way of silencing and
communicating to the victim that he or she is not worthy of inclusion
in the human community.
77
Hate speech directed against blacks and other minority groups has
no ready analog in speech against whites. "Honky" is more a badge of
respect than a put-down, as is "dead white males." "Cracker," while
disrespectful, lacks the ability to wound. "Redneck," too, implies power.
The fact is that our language contains nothing that compares to racist
insults against blacks and other minorities. Whites may suffer words of
criticism, envy, and so on, but there really is no such thing as hate
speech directed against them. The cultural background of meanings,
practices, and history that render "Nigger, go back to Africa" so offen-
sive and wounding for a black student is simply not there for whites, at
least in any comparable degree. Indeed, our culture contains a host of
narratives, plots, scripts, stories, and stereotypes that make it difficult
for speakers of color to be taken seriously when they do speak out
448-52, 1113-15 (3d ed. 1982).
73. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 544-48 (E. Cleary ed., 1984).
74. On fraud, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 72, at 304-08, 1048.
75. See Lawrence, supra note 54, at 452.
76. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559 (1989).
77. On the silencing argument, see Frank Michelman, Silencing and Caste, in THE PRICE WE
PAY, supra note 3.
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against unfair treatment.78 Moreover, the prevailing stereotype of the
black in our culture-stupid, lascivious, and so on-denies speakers
credibility. Who would put much faith in the words of someone who,
in the prevailing scripts and stock parts, is either an athlete, an action
figure like a cop, or a buffoon?
79
Hate speech wounds, then, and there is no ready recourse for it in
our system. The playing field is not neutral, the marketplace far from
equally open to all. Yet we treat demands for campus codes, torts for
racial slurs, and other remedies as though they were egregious breaches
of a legal principle-the First Amendment-that is of equal benefit to
all society. As we have urged in our previous writing, it is not."
Much the same drama is likely to be replayed on the international
law front as anti-hate speech and anti-pornography advocates turn to
this arena. A case can indeed be made that these forms of injurious
depiction violate international norms by inciting violence and stirring up
racial and other forms of hatred.8 International covenants and treaties
do require nations to take steps to prevent those forms of injury.'
Yet, all such efforts will inevitably be portrayed as demands for special
treatment and as illegitimate racial politics. A true cosmopolitan would
not complain of a slur directed to his or her ethnicity because he or
she has none. He or she is a citizen of the world, not tied to a par-
ticular culture, language, cuisine, or set of ethnic loyalties. How could
such a person dwell on the sting of an ethnic or other form of insult?
One of the reasons why hate speech injures is that it compounds, draw-
ing on a legacy of hatred and unfair treatment aimed at a group
throughout its history and coordinated against it still today 3 The cos-
mopolitan, who considers himself or herself the product of a multitude
of influences, genes, and cultures, does not consider that these wounds
and scars lie in his past, at least not in an exclusive or serious way.
Cosmopolitanism thus makes it difficult for us to see historic harms
and ones that today act in concert to disadvantage particular people. It
blinds us to the need for remediation, just as Wechsler's neutral princi-
ples84 and the neutralist approach to First Amendment jurisprudence
78. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic. Images of the Outsider in American Law and Cul-
ture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 COP.NEL. L REV. 1258 (1992).
79. Id. at 1261-75.
80. Id. at 1284-88.
81. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
83. Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules, supra note 56. at 38.84.
84. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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blind us, in the United States, to the need to redress school discrim-
ination and hate speech. But cosmopolitanism not only threatens to
render us insensitive to the needs of oppressed groups, it can perform a
real disservice to the majority group that embraces it. The writings of
the cosmo boys (most of whom, for reasons on which we will not
speculate, are males) make clear who the citizen of the world is: an
educated, white or white-trained student of Western culture and
ideas.86 He watches Western-made TV programs. While he may enjoy
Indian food, black music, and Eastern meditation techniques, he is thor-
oughly Western in outlook. He is not a Zulu warrior or Guatemalan
Indian-these are the residents of Disneyland that Professor Waldron
has no interest in saving.
Yet, there is a case for saving those cultures, one that does not rest
merely on sentiment or anthropology, and one that is quite consistent
with cosmopolitanism, as the two of us would like it to be understood.
Minority cultures will often possess knowledge that Western nations
need. For example, the cosmopolitan citizen that Waldron praises does
indeed live in a society whose technology and industry cross national
boundaries.8 7 Yet those industries also generate pollution that crosses
the same boundaries. As we and others have pointed out, the solution
to the environmental crisis may well entail a fundamental rethinking of
our relation to values such as nature, land, water, and wildlife.88 It
may well be that other cultures, including especially the Indians, are
more advanced in this respect.8 9 If those cultures fall by the wayside,
something our own civilization vitally needs to ensure its own survival
may be lost. Such is the case with old age care, an increasingly press-
ing need in our society, but a problem other nations seem to have
solved more satisfactorily than we.' Second, consider the range of
options from which Waldron's or Rushdie's cosmopolitan man picks
85. See supra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., the list of writers cited supra note 32 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE W. 1351, 1369, 1370, 1372
(1991).
88. Id.; see also Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's
Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of
Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1218-23 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Our Better Na-
tures].
89. Delgado, Our Better Natures, supra note 88, at 1220-21.
90. Delgado, Our Better Natures, supra note 88, at 1375; see also Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Third Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L.
REv. 387, 391-92 (1993).
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and chooses. Such a man may wish to eat Guatemalan food one day,
Caribbean the next. He may spend his vacation on an Indian reservation
or on safari in the Serengeti accompanied by a native guide. Will not
the cosmopolitan's range of options be radically narrowed if we do not
provide protection for diverse cultures? Life in U.S. and European
capitals is becoming increasingly the same. A banker in Amsterdam
lives in a house, drives a car, wears clothes, and watches TV programs
very much like his counterpart in New York or Seattle. Cosmopolitan-
ism in Rushdie's sense-the life of a vital, hybridized person of the
worldg -becomes difficult unless the options that make it possible are
preserved and protected. How could Richard Rodriguez's "I am Chi-
nese"92 make sense if San Francisco did not have a Chinatown? Yet
Chinatowns are precisely the Disneylike outposts, artificially maintained
through the determined solidarity of their members, that Waldron says
are inauthentic and should be allowed to lapse into desuetude.9
Im. LESSONS FROM THE COSMO-BATTLES: WHAT CAN PROGRESSIVE
PEOPLE LEARN?
There are thus many reasons not to apply cosmopolitanism as its
latter day advocates urge. Doing so stands to deprive so-called ad-
vanced countries of a source of knowledge and experience that they
may need.94 And, as we have pointed out, in narrowing the range of
options available, it renders cosmopolitanism of taste and life choice
difficult, if not impossible, even for Westerners.9S Is the recent inter-
pretation of it merely an intriguing "flip," a clever reversal, like politi-
cal correctness and reverse discrimination, put forward by conservatives
who basically do not much care for diversity and rowdy, noisy,
clamorous identity politics?96 We think there is more to it than that,
and that the kind of anti-minority, anti-identity sentiment that marches
under the cosmopolitanism banner has a thinly veiled power dimension.
Consider the timing of the cosmopolitan turn. Many formerly back-
ward nations, which suffered under the yoke of colonialism, are devel-
91. See supra notes 13-16, 26-32 and accompanying text.
92. Pico Iyer, The Global Village Finally Arrives. TIME, Fall. 1993. at 87 (Special Issue
entitled The New Face of America) (quoting Richard Rodriguez).
93. See supra notes 18-21, 24-25 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
96. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition. 35 WM. & MARY L REv. 1025
(1994) (detailing this movement).
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oping. They are building industry and beginning to contribute to pollu-
tion and the international environmental crisis. At the same time, their
populations are booming. Since many of them are still not yet economi-
cally self-sufficient nor politically stable, their excess populations are
finding their way to economically advanced countries in a wave of
immigration, both legal and illegal.9 7 If these countries can be persuad-
ed to be "cosmopolitan" and to accept environmental standards dictated
by the advanced countries and billed as "the law of nations," their
economic development will be slowed but pollution may be abated
somewhat.98 If they can be encouraged to cooperate with immigration
controls and standards according to which only urbane, skilled, college-
educated citizens (not unskilled laborers) will immigrate to the advanced
countries, countries in the First World will be better off. Third World
countries will be encouraged to forget historic injustices they have
suffered and grievances they may justly harbor, and begin doing busi-
ness with the advanced countries on terms which disrupt these First
World countries as little as possible.
Developing countries, like minority groups everywhere, need pro-
tection first, then the opportunity to assimilate ("mongrelize," as
Rushdie puts it) later. Unless this order is followed, cosmopolitanism
will be exploitive and one way, as exemplified, for example, by those
in the United States who appropriate black music but have little to do
otherwise with black culture," or like immigration laws that cause a
brain drain from Third World countries because they allow resettlement
by surgeons, engineers, and others likely to fit into the professional
managerial sectors of the economy.' °°
Finally, consider how Waldron ends his article. He gives a dire
warning of the dangers of Balkanization and warfare. He evokes the
image of exiled writers living under death sentences, of shells raining
down on innocent villagers-all of which he lays at the doorstep of
97. See The New Face of America: How Immigrants are Shaping the World's First
Multicultural Society, TIME, Fall, 1993 (Special Issue, The New Face of America, (collection of
articles on the effects of immigration on U.S. society)).
98. We are, of course, not saying that controlling pollution is bad. Rather, we merely point
out that the United States, which imposed few controls on itself during its period of rapid in-
dustrialization, is adopting a double standard with respect to Third World countries.
99. On the appropriation of black music by white entrepreneurs and society in general, see
MARTHA BAYLES, HOLE IN OUR SOUL ThE Loss OF MEANING IN AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC
(1992). See also Spike Lee, Mo' BETTER BLUES (7 Acres and a Mule Productions 1988).
100. On the "brain drain," see Eugene Skalnikoff, Internationalization of the Research Uni-




The images he points out are, indeed, deplorable. But
"Balkanization" properly refers to small nations feuding with each other
senselessly, reliving and settling old scores. When a small nation makes
a demand for recognition or protection or reparations from a large one
that has been mistreating it, that is not Balkanization, but rather an
exercise in national or group self-determination. From the viewpoint of
the English-educated philosopher sitting in his study, it may appear pet-
ty, rowdy, and the opposite of the serene Olympian spirit of a famous
novelist."r But that is because to such a person the history of oppres-
sion, stolen lands, smashed cultures, and damaged self-esteems that the
large nation may have been guilty of on its way to world power status
is not in the forefront of consciousness. To the smaller group, these
things are.
The moral for progressive people, then, is that there are no safe
havens, no areas of law-not jurisprudence, not moral philosophy, not
constitutional law, not international law-where one will be embraced,
where one will find wholehearted allies. There is no banner that cannot
be turned against one, just as conservatives have done with the con-
cepts we just mentioned and as .they are doing now with cosmopolitan-
ism. One can try flipping things back; for example, one can point out
that pain-avoidance and the impulse to counter discrimination are uni-
versal human needs, even more basic and entitled to protection than the
wish to be eclectic or to travel and enjoy other cultures and cuisines,
and that a true cosmopolitan would devote himself to abetting them.
One could, and should, make arguments such as these. But at the same
time, one should not lose sight of the more basic feature of the dialec-
tic that caused one to become beleaguered in the first place.
That is the hope that there is a structure of thought-or, if one
likes, a layer of legal doctrine--out there, somewhere, and that if one
could find it, it would do its magic and all the ills that befall one or
one's clients will fall away as though on command. There is no such
universal principle-which is not to say that there are not truths worth
fighting for. Pain is universally feared and shunned, All people desire
preservation and self-respect. People everywhere fear destruction of the
familiar social arrangements that give their lives meaning. Disneylands
101. Waldron, supra note 9, at 751. 793.
102. For a recent discussion of cosmopolitanism by a noted philosopher and several respon-
dents, see Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism. BOSTON REv., Oct/Nov. 1994, at
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are bad-and not just because they are tawdry, °3 but because they
almost always have racist stereotypes, of which their managers and
operators are blithely unaware until they are called to their attention
and insistently demanded to be removed."° Cosmopolitanism is good
only when it concedes these things, finds a place for identity politics,
and learns to take the best from small groups and cultures without
denying their right to exist.
103. Id. at 763-64.
104. On the Disney Corporation's resistance to removing racist shows and displays, see, e.g.,
Jon Wiener, Tall Tales and True, THE NATION, Jan. 31, 1994, at 33. For a critical assessment
of the Corporation's role, as well as that of its founder, see DouGLAs KENNEDY, WALT DIs-
NEY: HOLLYWOOD's DARK PRINCE (1994).
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